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FOREWORD 
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of 
professional interest to officers of the naval service. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are 
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy 
Department or of the Naval War College . 
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STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE NAVY; 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
An address delivered by 
'Vice Admiral Donald B. Beary, U.S.N. 
at the National' War College 
16 February, 1950 
General Bull and Officers of the National War College, I 
consider it a distinct honor to be invited to address such a highly 
selected group of officers. I must admit, however, that I was some­
what confounded when I received the suggested topic for my re­
marks, which was "Strategic Employment of the Navy; Past, 
Present and future". We have in our library many thousands of 
volumes covering the subject and to think that I could summarize 
them in a fifty minute talk is somewhat overcoming. However, i 
will try to give some of the most important points, generally con­
fining my remarks to World Wars I and II and future employment of 
the Navy. 
The basic fundamental mission of the Navy in the past and it 
will continue to be so in the future is to gain and maintain con­
trol of the sea lanes vital to our war effort and to deny to the en­
emy the sea lanes vital to him. 
By April 6, 1917, when we entered World War I, the Brit­
ish Navy had contained, though not destroyed, the German surface 
Navy, and our contribution to this containment was the sending of 
the 6th Battleship Division to·augment the British fleet. Our prin­
cipal effort was expended in combating the enemy submarines. You 
all know the outcome. As far as the Navy was concerned, the war 
was between surface and sub-surf ace craft. Shipborne air did not 
enter into it. 
Vice Admiral Be�ry is President of the Naval War College. 
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During the period from the end of the war until. 1933 we 
witnessed the rapid disintegration of our navy through armament 
limitation agreements and drastic curtailment of funds. Ship con­
struction practically ceased; research and development were seri­
ously curtailed and non-existent in that m:ost important develop­
ment which, though hampered by limited funds, made progress, and 
in March 1922 we had our first aircraft carrier, the converted col: 
lier, LANGLEY. 
The period from 1933 to 1941, when we suddenly found our­
selves in a war on two fronts, witnessed the slow but gradual build- . 
up of our navy, including destroyers, cruisers, battleships and car­
riers. The tempo increased with the rapid deterioration of the 
world international situation until the J aps bombed Pearl Har­
bor, when the sky was the limit. 
Though the Navy suffered terrific losses at Pearl Harbor, 
we were lucky 'in one respect and that was that not one of the 
seven aircraft carriers in commission was damaged. W-e had been 
knocked to our knees but were not out. 
Our basic military strategy as approved by the President was 
that initia�ly our major military effort would be made in the Euro­
pean theater, while holding or defensive operations were con­
ducted in the Pacific. We had lost control of the seas. Our 
Navy had been so seriously crippled and was so definitely inferior in 
power to the Jap Navy that there was no other answer. There-· 
fore, until the Navy could accomplish its mission of. regaining and 
maintaining the control of the sea lanes essential to the conduct 
of the war we had to assume a defensive position. 
As in World War I by the time we entered the war the 
British Fleet had contained the German surface Navy, which re­
quired an all out effort on its part; therefore the Japanese Navy 
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became our sole responsibility and we were not in a position to meet 
it head on. The best we could do was to conduct a few raids, hit and 
run operations. 
However, the extremely rapid advance of the Japs south­
ward through New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, which vitally 
threatened our line of communications with Australia, forced us 
to do something drastic to stop them. 
This something was the Battle of the Coral Seas on the 7th 
of May, 1942, followed by the Battle of Midway on June 4th, 1942, 
We sustained losses in these two battles but the enemy was so 
severely punished that her great superiority was reduced almost to 
equality with us. Our strength was growing rapidly. New con­
struction and trained personnel to man our ships and planes were 
being produced at a rate the enemy could not equal. We were on 
our way to gaining control of the seas. 
On August 7, 1942, we landed on Guadalcanal and, though 
the fighting was bitter and we took heavy losses, we stuck. The 
southward movement of the Japs was stopped, and we were now in 
a position to start the long drive to Tokyo. 
The grand strategy for this campaign consisted of two major 
efforts: 1st, a drive northward under command of General Mac­
Arthur, through New Guinea to the Philippines; and 2nd, a drive 
westward under Admiral Nimitz to Okinawa. After these pre­
liminary objectives were seized and consolidated they were to be the 
jumping off places for the final assault on Japan. Fortunately, 
after we had seized them the Japanese sued for peace on August 
15, 1945, and the final step, the invasion of Japan, was not neces­
sary. 
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The above plan of campaign required the use of. amphibious 
operations on a scale never attempted before. The prerequisit� 
/ i 
for success of these operations was control of the vital sea lane�, 
including control of the air over them. It required the accomplish� 
ment of something which many people said could not be done and 
that was that ship-based air power could not successfully �mbat 
and neutralize shore-based air power. The Navy did it. 
So much for the first part of the Navy's mission, that is, the 
gaining of control of the sea lanes vital to ou.r efforts. How about ' 
the second part, that is, denying to the enemy the sea lanes vital 
to hitn? 
From December 7, 1941, until the end of the war our sub­
marines did an outstanding job and accounted for the major effort 
in this regard assisted by occasional air and surface raids. With our 
seizure of the Philippines and Okinawa the long essential life line of 
the Japanese to Malaya and Indonesia was cut and the Japanese 
had lost the war through inability to support her military forces 
and feed her people. 
They started the war with about 7,000,000 tons of merchant 
shipping. They captured and built about 3,000,000 tons during the 
war, which gave them a total of about 10,000,000 tons. At war's 
end they had only about 1,500,000 tons left and only 750,000 tons of 
this was operable. There were only about 500,000 barrels of fuel 
oil left in all Japan, so you can readily see how effectively we had 
cut their vital sea lanes. As a matter of comparison our fast 
carrier task force used as much as 140,000 barrels of fuel oil per 
day. In other words, the Japanese had only three days supply of 
oil left on VJ day based on our consumption rate. 
This forcibly demonstrates that a nation's sea power is com­
posed not only of her combatant ship strength but of equal im-
4 RESTRICTED 
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portance is her merchant shipping. This fact is frequently dis­
regarded. 
So much for our naval strategy during World War II in the 
Pacific. Turning to the Atlantic, as I have said before, the Brit­
ish had contained, though not destroyed, the German surface Navy 
by the time we entered the war. The fight in that theatre was 
against their submarines. It was a tough battle and at one time was 
almost lost, but with the great improvement in detection devices, 
the tremendous increase in the numbers of escort vessels, the in­
troduction of "Hunter-Killer" tactics and more effective use of 
land-based air, we, the British and ourselves, were able to suc­
cessfully combat the German submarines and maintain control of 
the seas. 
The lesson we have learned from two world wars is that the 
submarine is a most important threat to our control of the seas, 
and that the introduction of faster under-water speeds and ability 
to run submerged for long periods of time have greatly increased 
the difficulties of successfully combating them. In my opinion it 
is the most important problem that confronts the Navy. It is one 
which must be solved and will require all the brains, talent and 
money we can get to solve it. I will refer to this later. 
So much for the strategy and mission of the Navy during 
the past two great wars. What about the future employment of 
our Navy? 
There is a vociferous, fanatical group of people in this 
country, who unfortunately receive more attention than their cause 
deserves, who say that air power has sunk the Navy and ships that 
sail on the surface of the seas. This is not true and all history re­
futes it. Some of these same fanatics say, "We don't care any­
thing about history; we make it." I cannot believe that any sound, 
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logical, sane, educated person would make such a statement or be,. 
lieve such a thing. 
All progress that man has madein whatever form of�science, 
engineering, art, living, government, etc., is a direct result of past 
trials and.errors and·suceesses. Naval science is no exception. The 
wise man learns and profits from the past and applies his knowledge 
to the present and the future. 
The end of World War II brought about a situation in 
naval affairs that had its most recent parallel during the Napoleonic 
Wars. At that time Napoleon had organized the States of West­
ern Europe jnto a continental alliance that was opposed by a single 
dominant sea power-Great Britain. After the defeat of the Com­
bined Fleet at Trafalgar, Europe faced a long period during which 
the naval strength of the continental powers could be employed 
only in the ''guerre de course"-war upon commerce.i The "guerre 
de course" is the classic weapon of the weaker sea power, but it 
will not win wars. After Trafalgar, England bottled up what was 
left of. the French Fleet in its home ports by means· of blockade, 
and her sea power was opposed only by such scattered forces as 
were able to skirt the blockade and prey on British merchant ship­
ping. Thus, absolute sea power, in a manner of speaking, was op­
posed to absolute land power. But the dominant sea power was 
without the physical means to settle the issue on the, continent; 
she lacked the resources in -fuen and material necessary . to prose­
cute land warfare on a large scale. And her continental adversary 
could not bring to bear against her its vast resources in land 
strength so long as it lacked sea power. 
Thereafter, Great Britain recognized it as her cardinal pol­
icy to pr�vent the rise on the continent of a single dominant power 
that might some day utilize the far greater resources of Europe 
to outbuild · her at sea. Britain steadfastly pursued this policy 
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right up until World War II, employing the weight of her in­
fluence and the pressure of her sea power to intervene in Europe 
and so preserve the balance of power on the Continent. 
Today, the cycle has reached full turn. A single con­
tinental power has arisen in Europe that threatens to exclude the 
Western democracies from the Eurasian Continent. That power 
is opposed by a complex of States that rim the Atlantic Ocean. The 
backbone of that complex is the sea power of Great Britain and the 
United States, upon which all the rest depends. Except for its sub­
marine arm--of which more later-the naval strength of the con­
tinental power is not great enough to make a serious bid for com­
mand of the seas. 
This state of affairs has created in the minds of many per­
sons a dangerous misconception-some of whom, indeed, may be 
responsible for the formulation of our national strategy. That 
misconception is that sea power cannot be fully effective unless it is 
opposed by sea power, weapon for weapon. The belief is widely 
held that if the Soviets do not have capital ships, then we do not 
need them; if they lack the striking power of carrier air, then 
this weapon has no place in our arsenal; and that it is sufficient 
simply to counter our opponent where he can strike us at sea, 
namely, by defeating his submarine fleet. 
I assure you, gentlemen, nothing could be farther from the 
truth. 
As I have said before, the Mission of the Navy in war can 
be reduced to a very plain statement: to make safe for our use the 
sea lanes we need and to deny to the enemy the sea lanes he must 
use to fight the war against us. Out of this simple Mission grows 
a multitude of tasks that require the use of many weapons. i:t will 
be my purpose here to state those tasks to you and to demonstrate 
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how the Navy can-and, I trust, will-carry out those tasks jf an­
other war is forced upon us. 
It is helpful, I think, when reviewing our overall strategic 
situation, to hold in mind a polar projection of the northern hemis­
phere centered somewhere near Moscow. The European penin­
sula is adjacent on the north, west, and south to waters of the At­
lantic, or waters tributary to it. To the southward of the Eura­
sian land mass, the Persian Gulf knifes in from the Indian Ocean 
to a point within a thousand air miles of Soviet industrial centers 
in the Caucausus and on the Caspian Sea. To the east, Siberia and 
China front the Pacific Ocean. Wherever the coasts of Europe and 
Asia meet the sea, Soviet power stops and ours begins. Thanks to 
Anglo-American sea-air power, the broad surface of the seas is 
denied to the enemy and is open to our use so long as we are able 
to defend our shipping from the enemy's submarines and his 
land-based air. 
At the present time, as you well know, we hold important 
strategic positions around the Eurasian continent from which our 
military strength could be projected against the Soviet Union. At 
the outset of any war, we shall hold an important lodgment in 
Western Europe. Whether we can successfully maintain a foot­
hold on the continent of Europe against the full weight of Soviet 
land power must, of course, be determined by the event. We 
believe that we can do so; and we are making heavy investments in 
the Atlantic Pact nations to make that expectation a reality. 
Outside the continental limits of Europe and Asia, we are estab­
lished in the British Isles, in other islands of the Atlantic, in 
north and east Africa, and at scattered points along the fringes 
of central and southeast Asia. We face the Soviets in eastern 
Asia and in the Japanese Islands and Okinawa. 
8 RESTRICTED 
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Thus, the entire Eurasian land mass is ringed by a serie-J 
of positions from which heavy blows could be directed anywhere 
against objectives on the Continent. In this situation there is dem­
onstrated the classic weakness of a strong land power opposed by a 
sea power having limited land strength. The land power cannot 
invade the territory of its opponent since it cannot transport its 
ground forces overseas. Although it may strike its enemy through 
the air, and indeed deal him fearsome blows, it cannot make their 
final by the ultimate invasion of his homeland. When ranged 
against a strong sea power, the land power can gain at the most 
only a stalemate. With this it must be content, since the oceans re­
main an effective barrier against the movement of troops in great 
force. 
Not so, the sea power. The flexibility of action that is af­
forded by control of the seas permits the sea power to deliver its 
main thrust--or a series of thrusts-from any direction. The 
enemy cannot be strong everywhere, and he cannot know forcer­
tain from whence the blow may fall. By the economy of the 
limited force that is available to it, the power that commands the 
sea can direct that force so as to obtain its maximum effect. 
These principles apply whether the force used be strictly 
carrier strikes on coastal objectives, long-range strategic air at­
tacks from peripheral bases, or amphibious invasion. Although 
the continental power retains the advantage of interior lines, they 
may prove of little value if its forces are over-extended and cannot 
be transported in time to meet the threatened attack. 
It would seem, therefore, that our basic strategy, in the case 
of a war against the Soviets, would be to preserve the sort of a 
condition I have just described. If we are ultimately to inter­
vene with ground troops on the continent of Europe-and it appears 
inevitable that we would have to do so-then such an interven-
RESTRICTED 9 
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 tion should be made only after the enemy has been seriously w�k-
ened by blows delivered with sea and air weapons from peripheral 
bases. 
It would be unwise to the point of folly, however, to assume 
that such a strategy is not apparent to our opponent or that, he 
will not do everything in his power to nullify it, if and when he, �r .
cides upon war. Having recognized that strategic air attacks m�y 
be carried out from advanced Allied positions against his in­
dustry and communications, it may well be that the enemy's first 
move in the event of war will be to capture or neutralize these 
positions. 
This, he has the capability of doing. True enough, the 
Soviets could neither hold nor support overseas positions in _the 
face of the pressure we could ultimately bring against their com­
munications, but, for a time, an initial move of this sort might 
have desirable effects. Such an opening move could conceivably 
take the form of an. atomic blitz against Britain, coupled with air­
borne and air-supported attacks on Iceland and our North AfriGan 
positions. In such a case, the effect of any pla:qned retaliatory blow 
would be seriously reduced. We would be for�ed to rely on North 
American bases and such advanced bases as we might continue 
to hold for the support of an initial strategic bomber offensive. 
Thereafter, we would be faced with a long, uphill pull to re-estab­
lish our forces at locations close enough to enemy targets to make 
the employment of our air power both effective and profitable. 
It will be clearly apparent to you that the support and reten­
tion of overseas bases will depend upon the ability of the fleet to 
keep open the lines of communications with those bases. The en­
emy will have at his disposal two primary weapons to prevent 
our doing so. One of these is the submarine; the other is land-based 
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air, where it can be brought within range of the sea routes our 
ships must use. 
As to the submarine, it is gratifying to observe the attention 
that is now being given to that problem and to note the agreement 
so widely reached that we must make a major effort toward its 
solution. Although I am unable to say to you that any final solu­
tion is as yet in sight, the means of detection and the weapons 
for use against the submarine are well in advance of those available 
at the end of the last war. 
There is a tendency, I fear, on the part of the public-and 
some members of the military-to over-emphasize the potentialities 
of the submarine and to overlook some basic disadvantages attend­
ant on its use as a primary weapon in the war at sea. 
The submarine is, fundamentally, a weapon of the "guerre 
de course". Commerce raiding has held a fascination for weaker 
naval powers throughout the history of naval warfare because of 
its cheapness. But it has never decided the issue in a major war. 
The British tried it themselves in the Anglo-Dutch War, when 
Charles II sought to gain a cheap victory over the Dutch and their 
French allies by preying on their commerce. This war ended, how­
ever, with a fleet of Dutch ships in the mouth of the Thames. 
During the war of the Spanish succession, the French devoted all 
their efforts at sea to the raiding of British commerce. Although 
the British lost hundreds of ships, their trade increased neverthe­
less, and French shipping all but disappeared from the seas. Mahan 
roundly condemned commerce raiding as a poor substitute for 
fleet action. His studious disciples, the Germans, placed primary 
reliance upon it as a means of naval warfare in both World Wars. 
Today, we have not yet found completely satisfactory meth­
ods of combating the most advanced types of submarines. But it 
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is by no means clear that the Soviets will be able to employ them 
effectively against the opposition that even now we are able to 
offer. 
The task of the submarines has been greatly complicated 
by new developments. As you know, the Germans found it neces­
sary to give their submarine crews long and intensive training 
periods in the Baltic in order to fit them for warfare against our 
convoys in the Atlantic. The shortening of their training periods, 
enforced upon the Germans during the latter stages of the war, 
was a great source of apprehension to Admiral Doenitz. The sub­
marine that we shall combat in the next war will require of its 
crews even greater technical proficiency than was attained by our 
recent enemies in the last. Whether or not they are capable of 
attaining this skill only time will tell. We should not discount it 
too much. 
So far, we have developed no acceptable substitute for the con­
voy nor for the "hunter-killer" tactics so effectively employed toward 
the end of the last war. We have, however, improved both our 
weapons and our techniques in the prosecution of these methods of 
anti-submarine defense. And other methods now under research 
and development give even greater promise of a final answer to the 
submarine problem. 
But convoy and passive protection of shipping alone is not 
enough. In the first instance, it surrenders to the enemy the initia­
tive and leaves him free to devise new methods of attack when old 
ones have failed. In the second, it forces upon us the need to pro­
vide shipping with greater and greater protection as enemy offen­
sive measures become more effective. And, finally, it permits the 
enemy to increase the size of his concentrations against us, since 
passive defense has no effect on his ability to build more sub­
marines. 
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Therefore, as a corollary to convoy and "hunter-killer" cover, 
we must take up the offensive against enemy submari�es before they 
leave their ports. We have numerous means of doing this. Many 
of them lie within the sphere of strategic bombing-particularly 
those that embrace attacks on building and assembly yards. But as 
the finished product nears the sea-when the fitting out and train­
ing stage commences-then, it may be within the power of the 
fleet to intervene. 
We shall seek to prevent the enemy from testing his boats 
and training his crews in sea areas that are adj.acent to the oceans. 
We shall mine his harbors and their exits, both by aerial and 
submarine laid mines. And we shall attack him from the air 
while his undersea craft are still in their pens. All of these are 
measures that not only may require the mobility and striking pow­
er of shipborne air, but are measures also to which it is especially 
adapted. It would, of course, be a mistaken and uneconomical use 
of sea-air power to carry out an offensive of this nature where en­
emy training areas, harbors, and bases are within the effective 
cover of land-based air. But in regions inaccessible to land-based 
aircraft capable of precision attack missions of this kind, aircraft 
from carriers may well be th_e only weapon that can do the job. 
As to the enemy's land-based air, we can expect it will be 
employed against our merchantmen much the same as it was in 
the last war. The Germans used long-range reconnaissance aircraft 
to locate convoys at sea. When a convoy was found, the position 
would be relayed by radio to submarines best disposed to attack. 
Thus, it would seem that some form of aerial reconnaissance will be 
necessary if Soviet submarines are to be employed advantageously. 
This means we shall have to screen our convoys against being 
scouted by the enemy's land-based air. It will not be an easy job 
to do. Limited, close-in screening can be carried out from escort 
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carriers, but, in view of the enemy's ability to install radar in his 
scouting aircraft, it is highly doubtful if we will be able to con-
ceal the location of our convoys. 
An obvious alternative would be to destroy the) Ememy's re­
connaissance aircraft at its coastal bases. In some instances, it 
should be possible to do this by land-based air strikes, provided 
their are friendly fields within range. Elsewhere, fast carrier task 
force strikes will be the only means of getting at these air�raft. On 
the whole, the maintenance of absolute control of the �ir above 
convoy routes will be a .difficult task to accomplish because of the 
inordinate effort required to screen shipping again�t lqi:tg-range 
reconnaissance aircraft. It should be possible, however, to de­
f end merchant convoys against direct attack by land-based planes 
by the provision of escort carriers in waters where danger of en­
emy air attack exists. In the narrow seas, withi:ri close range of 
enemy air bases, heavy covering forces consisting of carriers and 
gunfire ships will doubtless be required to fight the convoys through. 
Our experience in the Mediterranean during the last war indicates, 
however, that merchant convoys can be moved ih the presence of 
strong land-based air, provided carrier-borne aircraft is supplied in 
adequate strength. 
This leads us to a consideration of the carrier task force as 
the primary weapon of naval warfare. As you know, the fleet ac­
tions of Midway and the Coral Sea marked the beginning of a new 
era in naval warfare and confirmed the aircraft carrier as the real 
capital ship of the future. It is the most powerful offensive weapon 
we have. The big-gun ship has now assumed primarily the status 
of a surface escort for the carrier, although it has other uses. As 
the war in the Pacific progressed, the striking power of carrier 
aircraft against objectives other than enemy fleets was forcibly 
demonstrated. Indeed, so effective did carriers prove in securing 
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local control of the air at heavily defended land targets that surface 
operations until then conceived as impracticable were confidently 
planned and successfully carried out. 
The aircraft carrier derives its value from a number of tacti­
cal qualities, but it possesses one feature that transcends all the 
others: It is a mobile base that can be brought close enough to 
enemy targets. to launch aircraft with their optimum fighting ca­
pabilities unimpaired. Of course, the fact that carriers may be 
concentrated, and thus multiply their effectiveness; that they may 
be employed with surprise; that they may cruise for long periods 
in distant waters; and that they have great flexibility as to the 
targets against which they may be employed; all these, too, are 
important. But the ability to operate aircraft at short ranges­
which the carrier imparts-is the unique feature that is unmatched 
in any other weapon of aerial warfare. The carrier sends up an 
aircraft with a minimum fuel load compared to that of land planes 
that must be launched from more distant bases. Hence, it can 
devote a greater portion of its carrying capacity to offensive and 
defensive weapons, and it can be employed with greater frequency 
since it has a shorter distance to fly. These advantages combine to 
increase the striking power of carrier aircraft, not directly with 
the decrease in range to the target, but more on the order of a 
geometrical proportion with the decrease in range. 
All of these tactical features add up to provide for Allied 
sea-air power a strategic advantage that cannot be offset by its 
opponent. By means of air-sea task forces employed in adequate 
strength, we should be able to overwhelm the enemy at any 
point within reach of our carrier-borne aircraft. It is this ability 
that has in the past permitted us to paralyze enemy defenses at 
the end of a long overseas movement of amphibious forces. It is 
this ability which, I trust, will in the future permit the support 
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and retention of overseas positions we may need to drive the war 
home to the enemy. 
I think we may accept it as a sound military principle 
that when one component of the nation's armed force has been as­
signed a specific task, it should be free to investigate the nature 
of that task against the background of its own peculiar talents and 
experience. Only by this means will it be able competently to de­
termine how best to do the job it has been given. 
Now, the Navy has been allocated those tasks that require 
the use of weapons peculiar to sea-air power. Nobody disputes 
that. These tasks do not involve the direct participation of any 
other service. One of them is to employ the striking power of 
carrier-based air against certain enemy targets that can be 
reached from the sea. Accordingly, the Navy has put its best 
brains and its most experienced officers to work on the problem of 
how most effectively to employ carrier-based air against the op­
position we may expect in the future. This is a technical problem 
that requires solution by persons who are by training and ex­
perience intimately acquainted with all the factors involved. I think 
you will agree that such knowledge and experience can best be ob­
tained from within the Navy itself. 
Briefly stated, it has been the result of the Navy's investi­
gation of this problem that we cannot expect to overcome deter­
mined opposition at all enemy targets that are vulnerable to sea­
air attack unless we employ the most advanced types of aircraft 
that are available to us. We are aware of developments in Soviet 
aviation and along other lines of anti-aircraft defense. There can 
be 110 doubt these measures would have a high degree of effect­
iveness against the aircraft for which our present carriers were 
built. 
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But we, too, have made corresponding advances in the art 
of aircraft design and construction. We can build planes today 
that we believe will out-perform anything the Soviets will have 
in the foreseea}?le future. These are the planes we will, need if 
we are successfully to exploit the unique weapon of sea-air power. 
Unfortunately, we cannot adapt our present-day carriers­
which, as you know, were designed under conditions of the last 
war-to the new high-performance aircraft without sacrificing some 
of their most valuable performance qualities. The Navy should 
be free to build the carriers it needs to carry and operate the planes 
necessary for it to carry out.its mission. 
We must, I feel, remain keenly alert to changing tactical 
and technological conditions that dictate changes in strategic con­
cepts. Hardly a month passed during the last war but what some 
naval developnient, however minor, contributed its small influence 
to large revisions in our strategic thinking. 
One of the most · significant of these developments was the 
operation of carrier task forces relatively independent of forward 
bases. In past wars, the radius of action of naval forces was de­
termined by the availability of bases-or at least of coaling sta­
tions-in advanced areas where the fleet sought to operate. Bases 
have traditionally been one of· the essential components since 
fleets acquired freedom of mobility with the advent of steam. The 
sea power of Great Britain was magnified an<l reinforced by heP 
numerous naval stations in all the oceans of the world. Th.ese 
bases made it possible for Britain to extend the range of her 
. fleets; and they, in turn, depended on the Fleet for security and 
protection against overseas attack. Until World War II, it was ac­
cepted as axiomatic by naval strategists that no nation could aspire 
to control of sea areas far distant from the homeland unless she 
had access to bases in waters where the fleet was to, be employed; 
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Today, that is changed. In World War II, we were faced;with 
a situation in the Pacific that threatened severely to limit ,�he 
striking power of the naval weapon. We lacked· bases in waters 
where we hadto carry the fight to the enemy. So we made our bases 
mobile, and we took them where we pleased. As a result, our fleets 
are today virtually independent of overseas bases. The flexibility 
of the sea�air weapon has been multiplied, and for limited periods 
we are able to bring to bear the full striking power of the Fleet in 
waters wherever ships can sail. 
The strategic implications of this naval development I ani 
sure are not lost on you. What we are now able to -do is to bring to 
bear the full strength of our sea-air power where and when we wish 
and to maintain the pressure for prolonged periods of time. 
Of course, advanced bases still are of great value. They 
serve two main purposes. First, we need locations in forward areas 
where we can send ships for repair of battle damage that would 
otherwise require a long trip to shipyards in the rear, !:1-nd we need 
them also to patch up heavily damaged ships so that the voyage 
home may be made in safety. Secondly, we need advanced ports 
where stores and ammunition can be transferred from incoming 
cargo ships to the specially constructed logistics ships that. work in 
the fleet. But neither of these functions requires an establishment 
on shore. The facilities needed for the operation of an advanced base, 
including major ship repair, may be entirely waterborne. Thus, 
any protected anchorage favorably situated with respect to the zone 
of combat may be placed into use as a floating base just as soon 
as the specialized logistics ships can be brought forward. 
Now, before closing, I want to touch briefly on the atomic 
bomb and what it means to the future of naval warfare. I think 
it is safe to say that nuclear fission has had an impact on existing 
theories of warfare more severe than any other new weapon in his-
18 RESTRICTED 
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss4/1
RESTRICTE:Q 
tory. It has radically disturbed our pre-conceived notions involving 
the disposition of forces and the principles of concentration and 
mass. Paradoxically enough, we, who first developed the bomb, 
have suffered most by the upsets it has produced in the technique 
of warfare. 
Our military experience in World War II was gained at 
enormous cost. In the field of naval warfare, we 'battled our way 
slowly and painfully from Pearl Harbor to Okinawa, meanwhile 
gai_ning a "know-how" in the use of naval weapons that is un­
matched by any nation in the world. But at the very end of the 
war a new, more powerful weapon appeared that now threatens 
to undo much of what we have learned. 
The influence atomic weapons will have on maritime strategy, 
however, is not yet clearly defined. For the present, we must ad­
just ourselves to this situation just as we have in the past, when 
�ew means of attack have seemed to render obsolete ships and 
weapons then . in use. Naval· history is replete with instances 
where some new weapan has threatened to make the ship no long­
er an effective instrument for controlling the seas. When the ex­
plosive shell supplanted a solid shot for use against the wooden man­
of-war, . pessimistic observers were convinced great ships could 
never stand up against this. terrible new weapon. But shortly 
afterward, the ironclad ship made its appearance; and sea control 
continued to be exercised, as U�\lal, by the · Power having the 
largest fleet of heavy ships. When the Whitehead torpedo was 
introduced, it seemed evident the death of the capital ship was 
at hand. So convinced were the French of this fact that they 
temporarily gave up the building of large ships in favor o� small 
torpedo boats, each able to launch a lethal attack upon a battle­
ship. But it turned out that these small craft could reach their 
targets only under favorable conditions of sea and weather, and 
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that they were highly vulnerable to the defensive fire of their 
ponderous opponents. Moreover, improvements in underwater pro­
tection tended to redress the balance in favor of the ship. With 
the advent of the airplane, it appeared certain to most advocates 
of air power that large ships would become easy prey to aircraft 
able to launch against them bombs weighing five hundred or a 
thousand pounds. Instead, the present day capital ship-with its 
powerful anti-aircraft weapons, under radar control and firing in­
fluence-fuzed shells augmented by its own air coverage-has be­
come an extremely tough target, even to large flights of aircraft. 
And so it goes. I think the lesson to be learned here was 
best expressed by Mahan when he cautioned against being too 
quick in discarding the old as well as too slow in adopting the new. 
We know, of course, that a single atomic bomb will destroy 
a single ship. But we know also that fighting ships underway and 
suitably dispersed will suffer but slightly from an atomic explosion, 
except by direct hit. This would seem to make the use of atomic 
bombs against mobile forces extremely doubtful. 
On the other hand, heavy concentration of ships in ports or 
amphibious operations might off er suitable and worthwhile targets. 
The present answer seems to be greater dispersion and control of 
the air over the vital areas. It is not beyond reason that we shall 
in the future evolve a defense against the atomic bomb that will 
prove effective. 
Now as to push button warfare, including rockets, jet pro­
pelled bombs, guided missiles, etc., fortunately, the solution of that 
problem seems very remote. At best they probably will never be pre­
cision weapons and whether or not they will be used against mo­
bile naval forces is problematical. As you know, counter measures 
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are being devised but have not yet been overly successful. It is a 
problem which is of vital importance to all the armed services. 
In conclusion, gentlemen, if there is one single thought I 
should like to leave with you, it is this: Command of the sea is 
vital to us in war. I think that summarizes all I have- had to say. 
Unless we have command of the sea, our war-making force must re­
main based within our continental borders. Without it, we cannot 
support our allies, and we shall be left to face the enemy alone. 
It is the job of the Navy to provide that command. The 
Navy by itself cannot win a war. But the Navy alone can create 
conditions without which victory cannot be possible. Those 
conditions are these: to make safe for our use the sea lanes we 
-need and to deny to the enemy the S!ea lanes he must use to 
fight the war against us. 
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CAPABILITIES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, INCLUDING 
NAVAL THINKING ON ITS EMPLOYMENT 
Extracts from a Lecture by 
Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons, U.S.N. 
at the Naval War College 
February 16, 1950 
My lecture is supposed to be about naval thinking on the em­
ployment of the atomic bomb. I find difficulty in separating naval 
thinking from military thinking and national thinking in this case. 
I don't think that you can draw any sharp or beneficial distinction 
between them. They necessarily interact on each other and are 
included under this heading of national thinking. 
It is necessary even to go into what we mean by thinking 
itself. I have been impressed by the type of thinking which has 
gone on since 1945. I've followed it rather carefully, and I have 
been affected by it. I think the term "visceral thinking" applies 
to quite a lot that has been done since 1945. There are inarticu­
late visceral thinkers, who take a set of facts and draw some most 
remarkable conclusions from them. The inarticulate visceral 
thinkers are of the type who do not pay much attention to news­
papers and radio programs. They are almost impervious to what 
we call propaganda. They are also inarticulate because they don't 
read much and certainly wouldn't think of writing very much. 
Those people take a set of bare facts such as these : "We had to 
land in Normandy; we had done a lot of bombing; in spite of that 
we had to march through on the ground. But when we dropped 
two atomic bombs on Japan they surrendered." That's all they think 
Admiral Parsons is presently on duty with the Weapons System 
Evaluation Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has been 
associated with the atomic bomb project since 1943 and was bomb 
commander at the Hiroshima bombing. 
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of, and then don't analyze it at all. That, I think, is behind a great 
deal of the terrific worry and pressure which has prodded and 
harassed the Atomic Energy Commission and has maintained the 
atomic energy program. That is plain reflex-deduction from a set 
of facts without any critical appraisal of those facts, what went be­
hind them, or anything else. Their conclusions are drawn: "A sur­
render of Japan occurred after two atomic bombs were dropped. A 
surrender did not occur in Europe because atomic bombs were not 
used." 
The articulate thinkers, including some atomic· scientists for 
the first several years during the pre-Blackett era of articulate 
thinkers, created the concept of the "absolute weapon." They 
were using "visceral thinking" but they were rationalizing and 
dressing it up in very impressive language. That concept of the 
"absolute weapon" was still obtaining in full force when I spoke here 
in September, 1948. I found it necessary to go into it, to go into its 
expression, its impact on concepts which were being reported as 
war plans, and I had to work it over rather thoroughly. Then within 
three weeks, Dr. Blackett's book came out. The British edition 
that came out first, was called "Military and Political Consequences 
of Atomic Energy." The American edition was titled "Fear, 
War and the Bomb." The book is a most remarkable analysis. I 
would say it is by far the best presentation. in English, of the 
Russian point of yiew. It really sharpened the issues in this case 
and it was a terrific shock to many of our highest-powered scientists 
who had been associated with radar, atomic-energy development, 
proximity fuse development, and had seen their work bear fruit in 
important military consequences during the war. Dr. Blackett had 
received the American Medal for Merit for his very fine work in 
anti-submarine operations analysis during the war. He was -given 
similar decorations in England, I believe. As his book was pub-
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lished he also received the Nobel Prize for his work, beginning in 
the early twenties, in nuclear physics. Doctor Blackett had been an 
officer in the Royal Navy during World War I. He had then gone 
into physics. He had about the best mental equipment for opera­
tions analysis and scientific military appraisal of any scientist of his 
time. That was quite a shock, as I say, to our scientists who had 
thought that their analyses of military consequences and military 
tactics should be absolutely sound because they had used scientific 
methods in producing them. This was a demonstration, by one of 
the best equipped, best thinkers among physicists and scientists in 
general, that you could take a set of facts, that you could handle 
them in apparently scientific fashion and you could prove practically 
anything that your apparent religion and philosophy demanded to 
be proved, and do it, not in Russia, but right in England, using the 
accepted terminologies and accepted operations research methods. 
It was a terrible blow to our Operations Analysts and other 
scientists in the United States to have one of their most eminent 
members write this book. That was independent of the impact of 
the book itself. I have just given the impact on the scientists. 
The book probably had a beneficial effect in many ways, because 
it sharpened the issues and caused people to re-examine the facts 
to see how Blackett could be combatted. That was the beginning 
of a new era in the articulate arguments on atomic energy and 
its military consequences. 
That illustrates to me a very necessary thing in working over 
facts, particularly intelligence observations and in thinking of what 
Russia, for instance, can do under certain conditions. To go back 
to Ptolemy and Copernicus, you can say that imagining the sun and 
the stars as revolving around the earth because it "looked that 
way" was an example of "visceral thinking" which was dignified 
by some of the best so-called scientists for hundreds of years. The 
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accurate, correct interpretation had to be fought over for just that 
length of time before people would actually look at this set of 
facts and derive the correct conclusion from them. 
I will now mention another recent shock. We operated un­
der a semi-dictatorship in World War Two. We had absolute 
priority of effort, and we got results like the Manhattan District, 
production of aircraft and production of fleets. We then demob­
ilized and concentrated on automobiles, television and like things. 
But we forgot that Russia had not demobilized and was still op­
erating under a dictatorship more rigid and perhaps as dynamic as 
the one that we had operated under in World War Two. We did not 
take account of certain little red flags that were flying. I'm lead­
ing up to this shock that we experienced when the announcement 
came out on the 23rd of September about a Russian atomic ex­
plosion. We were quite shocked. But if we had thought of Cf'l'­
tain things which had occurred, such as the obvious flying around 
of wing jet fighters and many copies of our B-29, when we knew 
how hard it had been for us to put anything like that number into 
the air, we would have been less shocked. Those red flags indi­
cated that regardless of how inefficiently rail transportation and 
various other routine operations were carried out in Russia, when 
they assigned top priority to a job, it really rolled. That made it 
not too much of a shock to some of us who had been observing 
those red flags flying. But indicates the kind of trap into which 
we can fall when we sit in one type of organization, one type of 
climate, one type of pressure and try to estimate what someone 
else is going to do, living under a completely different system with 
uiff erent motivations. 
That leads me into one or two final points. I was very 
much impressed with the talk General Marshall gave this week 
at the National War College. I'll mention just one of his points. 
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He was commenting on the old Army War College, but I think his 
remarks applied to war colleges in general. He said that it is very 
necessary to be as concrete as possible in plans and to get away as 
far as we can from purely abstract statements. He warned that 
the difficulties we had had with Army War College Command and 
Staff schools and staff people, were their tendency to deal in the 
abstract rather than the concrete. He gave an illustration occurring 
at an early peak of activity, say in 1939, '40 and '41, when he, as 
Chief of Staff, and as Deputy Chief of Staff before that, was fac: 
ing concrete problems not very far away from the Army War 
College. They were taking it very easy with their two-week man­
euver, or whatever it was called. He said that he would like to ex­
pose them to some of the real facts of life, and the way it would oc­
cur would be this: They would be given two-thirds of the neces­
sary information for working out a problem on Saturday noon; 
they would work over the week-end at highest pressure on those two­
thirds of the problem; on Monday, they would be given the missing 
third which showed that they would have to throw all their work 
over the week-end into the waste-basket; on Tuesday the rules 
would be changed, and on Thursday the whole solution would be 
thrown out. 
Citing the need for realism and concreteness does not imply 
ability to predict events. Dr. Isaiah Bowman, retiring president of 
Johns Hopkins made a pertinent comment when we asked him how 
he had made such very good predictions of events to come. In the 
last fifteen years, he has been credited with having hit the nail on 
the head with many of them. In denying this ability he said, "I 
don't think that it is possible for anyone to predict in detail what 
will happen. The actual event depends too much on pure accident 
and the personalities of people involved." 
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lessons of history, and get some reassurance from them with res­
pect to the probability of the human getting permanently or too 
tragically out of control. 
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TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
A lecture delivered by 
Rear Admiral George W. Baurenschmidt, U.S.N. 
at the Naval War Colle� 
February 16, 1950 
In the last war production as a problem was solved very 
early, but the problem of distribution was not solved. Transporta­
tion is a major component of distribution. Traffic management 
is a major component of transportation. My subject today is 
"Traffic Management." But it cannot be discussed without a dis­
cussion first of transportation as it pertains to logistics. 
We are. accustomed to thinking of war in terms of fighting, 
but you here at the Logistics Course of the War College must by 
now recognize that the major part of modern war is logistics, and 
transportation is a big part of logistics. The statistics of trans­
portation in the Second World War are impressive and colossal. 
Cargo and passenger ships outnumbered fighting ships many 
times over. The Army, which depended almost entirely on truck 
transportation in the European theater, had 30,000 men just op­
erating railroads in that theater. The tonnage hauled away from 
the United States for the war effort can be represented as half a 
thousand billion ton miles, while inside the United States the 
railroads alone in one year hauled three quarters of a thousand 
billion ton miles. The Navy each day during the war turned over to 
carriers in the United States an average of 100,000 tons of material. 
These statistics are not only colossal, they are beyond comprehen­
sion just as is the National debt, which, in no small part, represents 
transportation costs. I cannot stress too much the point that in 
modern war, transportation is a factor to be given ever greater 
Admiral Baurenschmidt is Deputy Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. 
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consideration for its importance; cost, and.effect grow 'and grow. as 
new techniques of war develop. The soldier of Caesar's Legions 
furnished his own transportation and lived off the land, but in the 
intervening 2000 years since the days of t,hese Legions, such things . 
as gun powder, petroleum, feeding habits and spare parts have 
made transportation a matter of grave concern· to the military 
leader. 
Transportation is a chain of many links including the actual 
media of movement such as trucks, trains, planes and ships, and 
including terminals, ports, landing fields and storage facilities. In 
time of war, or any other time of maximum utilization of trans­
portation, all links of this chain must be of equal strength. Thus 
the capacity of railroad cars serving a port must be matched by 
port capacity, ship capacity, and finally capacity at the terminal 
at the other end of the overseas haul. A bottleneck anywhere re­
duces the efficiency of the whole. The result of imbalance was con­
spicuous in the First World War when there w�s an actual back­
ing up of 200,000 loaded freight cars at New York because of in­
sufficient port facilities and vessels capacity. To give you some 
idea as to what 200,000 freight cars constitute in the way of a 
block to traffic, they jam the facilities of the railroads from New 
York all· the way back to Pittsburgh. Proper balance between 
the links of transportation can be maintained in some pa� by the 
carrier operators, but by far the greater agent in maintaining this 
balance is good traffic management. 
The Second World War shows that much has been learned 
from the lessons of the first great war. There were no serious 
breakdowns in transportation even though imbalances did exist, 
and to show you that imbalance did· exist and in part to indicate 
how they weretaken care of, I can state that Navy material await­
ing transportation across the Pacific was backed . up for want of 
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shipping, backed up as far as Illinois, but the effect of this back­
up on transportation was kept to a minimum by the expedient of 
retaining the material in warehouses. In other words whenever 
it became apparent that the material could not be moved forward 
beyond a certain point, it was placed in warehouses until it could 
move forward and so the Navy operated warehouses from San 
Francisco to Illinois. 
Just as there were lessons to be learned from the First 
World War so are there lessons to be learned from the Second. 
Two of these are : first, there is a need for more intelligent use of 
port facilities, and second, there is a need for the use of more 
ports with less emphasis on the large ports. Under the National 
Security Resources Board there is an agency studying the Na­
tion's needs for transportation in the next war and the means to 
best satisfy those needs. This agency, come the next war, will 
probably be the successor to the Office of Defense Transportation, 
which operated in the last war. The name of this agency is Of­
fice of Transportation and Storage. It is planning port-utilization 
now and has established rules and an organization, which should do 
much to promote maximum port utilization. In the last war we 
shipped most of our cargo through the East Coast ports of New 
York, Norfolk, Boston and Philadelphia, and through the West 
Coast ports of San Francisco, San Pedro, Seattle, and Port 
Hueneme. The disadvantages of this type of operation are self­
apparent. First, such concentration of war material and transporta­
tion facilities offers excellent targets in the age of atomic warfare. 
It also narrows the hunting fields of the wolf packs of submarines. 
Just as important as the first two is the fact that this restrictive 
use of the Nation's port facilities overtaxes the ones that are used, 
the railroads that serve them, while leaving comparatively idle 
many smaller ports and the railroads serving them. It is the 
Navy's intention, and I have been assured that it is the intention 
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In other words, it is not merely sufficient that he balance the charges 
of one carrier against those of another but he must also include such 
items as the cost of packaging required for each mode of travel, 
and such items as stevedoring. When using premium transporta­
tion to achieve speed, he must not only weigh need against cost, 
but he must provide for, or insure that, his package is transferred 
to a more reliable but slower means of conveyance whenever the 
premium type carrier is unable to perform. 
The matter of cost of transportation is not the simple one 
of inquiring of each carrier what he will charge to haul a specific 
load of freight. The tariff structure is complicated and a rather 
wide field for negotiation even though rates have been published. 
The Armed Services have been subjected to a fair amount of criti­
cism because they failed to negotiate in transit rates for tre­
mendous amounts of material moved during the recent war. I can 
describe an in transit rate somewhat in this fashion. Short hauls 
cost more per mile than do long ones, but when material is des­
tined to make a long haul, which is interrupted, the carrier may 
legally charge the short haul rate, but the user may demand and 
get the long haul rate. 
Suppose, for example, Mechanicsburg is shipping engine 
parts to San Francisco, but these parts should be added to other 
parts at Clearfield to form full kits. If the Navy claims in transit 
privileges it may ship the parts to Clearfield where Clearfield 
works on them for several weeks and then sends them on in kits to 
San Francisco. The Navy may claim through rates for the parts 
from Mechanicsburg to Clearfield and for that portion of the ship­
ment from Clearfield to San Francisco which represents the origi­
nal parts. Involved also in the matter of rates is the commodity 
classification. Rates have been established for each commodity. It 
is incumbent upon the shipper to designate his shipment as falling in 
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that commodity group which is both appropriate and carrying 
the minimum rate. To illustrate this point, I cite the case of the 
man who went to the cereal manufacturer and stated that he could 
save him large sums of money. The manufacturer was skeptical 
but finally entered into a contract which proved to be lucrative to 
both the manufacturer and the man. The man's proposal was 
that the manufacturer stop calling his product the shredded wheat 
biscuits and merely call it shredded wheat, because under the first 
.name the product took the tariff for bakery products since it was 
called a biscuit, while under the second name it took the much lower 
tariff for cereals. The services have been criticized for failing to 
take advantage during the recent war of in transit privileges and 
proper commodity classification. It is true that leisurely analysis 
after the war can show that a billion dollars could have been saved 
by better traffic management but so can every Monday-morning 
quarterback prove to you how last Saturday's game could have been 
better played. 
Traffic management has been defined many times. I shall 
give you a definition which may be over-simplified, but which focuses 
attention upon its salient features. Traffic management is the 
science of procuring for the shipper the cheapest possible transporta­
tion consistent with delivery requirements in times of· peace, and, 
especially in time of war, securing the greatest and most effective 
utilization of carrier capacity. 
This appears to be the age of centralization in government, 
and that in spite of the fact that almost a generation ago big busi­
ness found that over-centralization was costly, and big business 
has long since decentralized in many areas. We·are urged today to 
centralize under one head all transportation controls in the Navy. 
Then to centralize under one head all transportation controls for the 
Army, Navy and the Air Force. And finally, we. are .told to central-
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ize under one head all transportation controls for the Department 
of Defense and for all other Government departments. And yet 
during the recent war both the Army and Navy found it necessary 
to decentralize their transportation controls to agencies in the field. 
Some concentration is indicated. How much there will be remains 
to be seen. As of the moment there has been formed a Central 
Military Land Traffic Office to perform under the administration 
of the Army certain functions which the Army, Navy and Air 
Force were mutually agreed could be centrally performed and yet 
leave to each of the three departments those functions of traffic 
management which each of the three services at present believe 
essential to its own adequate operation. Some of these functions 
are: (a) Negotiation of rates and charges on after-the-fact ship­
ments, (b) Issuance of freight classification guides, (c) Negotia­
tion of rates and average demurrage agreements, (d) Issuance of 
export release permits under conditions of war or emergency only, 
(e) Exchange of information as to availability of service-owned
equipment to promote maximum use, (f) Operation of freight
consolidating and distributing stations if and when established by
mutual agreement in times of war or emergency. To the functions
assigned to the Central Military Land Traffic Office can be added
other functions when the three departments are satisfied that it
is appropriate to lodge them there. Should the departments feel
that any of the present functions are improperly lodged in that
Office, they may be removed and restored to the several depart­
ments. So far the operation of this central office appears to be
satisfying all three services. Further, it is hoped that by the im­
provement in their operations the three departments may satisfy
the General Services Administration and other agencies of the Gov­
ernment that it will be unnecessary to centralize any traffic manage­
ment of the three military departments in any other agency of the
government. The three military departments are already of the
opinion that it would be unwise so to do.
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Just as there are some in the government who are clamor­
ing for centralization and more centralization, so are there those 
who within the Department of Defense advocate that transportation 
be divided between its three major media and assigned to the three 
departments. Under this concept the Department of the Army 
would budget for and operate all land transportation, while the De­
partment of the Navy would budget for and operate all sea trans­
portation, and the Department of the Air Force would perform sim­
ilar functions for all air transportation. This theory, like many 
another theory before it, sounds very attractive and plausible. 
Those who advocate it persuade many, but never do they persuade 
one who has a sound comprehension of traffic management. There 
are many sound arguments against this compartmentation or frag­
mentation of traffic management. I can illustrate the general tenor 
of most of them by stating that it is essential that one brain or 
group of brains direct the routing of a single shipment from its 
point or origin to its final destination. Let us assume that traffic 
management has been fragmented into its three components. Let 
us consider a single shipment that involves only land and sea trans­
port. And let us suppose that this shipment originates in Ohio and 
is destined for Tokyo. First it falls into the hands of the land 
transportation traffic manager. He is interested in getting this 
shipment to tide water and off his hands in the minimum time and 
at the minimum cost. He, therefore, routes it from Ohio to Hamp­
ton Roads. This does not suit the sea transport people for it in­
volves the long haul from Hampton Roads through the Canal and 
out to Tokyo. The sea transport people would much prefer that 
the shipment be consigned to San Francisco where they can pick it 
up and carry it to T'okyo for the cheapest rates and in the shortest 
time. If, however, a single brain is planning the movement from 
its point of origin to its destination, this brain might well balance 
all time and all costs and arrive at the solution that the cheapest 
over-all routing within the allowed time would be to ship by rail 
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from Ohio to New Orleans, and by sea from New Orleans through 
the Canal to Tokyo. There are similar arguments predicated upon 
the use of premium transportation and others upon the budgetary 
problems involved. The operation of sea transport has been as:. 
signed to the Navy, and the operation of MATS has been assigned 
to the Air Force. · Regretably there are no major land carriers 
which are owned by the Department of Defense and the operation 
of which could be assigned to the Army. It, therefore, looks as 
though the Army has been short changed. Unless I have missed 
some important point the probability is that within a very few 
years the Army will find that it has gained rather than lost in this 
assignment for it looks very much as though the Navy will ulti­
mately be required to assume budgetary responsibility for MSTS 
and the Air Force a similar responsibility for MATS leaving the 
Army unburdened with any similar responsibility since all three 
services are required to budget for their land transportation. Those 
who advocate fragmentation of transportation do so because they 
mistake carrier operation for traffic management. It is the first 
which has been assigned and not the second and there is no direct 
relationship between the two. Unfortunately it is not only those 
who cannot differentiate between carrier operation and traffic man­
agement who are advocating this fragmentation. There is also a 
group of people who would expand their own empire. I point the 
finger at no one department. All three have their empire builders 
in the fields of transportation. 
It is perfectly true that in assigning carrier operations to 
the Navy and to the Air Force certain traffic management functions 
have gone to those two services incident to this assignment. These 
traffic management functions are essentially those of routing once 
the cargo has been made available to the carrier. In the case of 
MATS this is of little significance in view of the fact that the 
charter of private planes has been reassigned by MATS to the 
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three departments, MATS only retaining clearance to be sure that 
chartered planes are used to maximum capacity. In the case of 
MSTS the three departments, as shippers, have the right to lay 
down their cargo at any port they choose. From there on it be­
comes the responsibility of MSTS to deliver the cargo to its over­
seas destination and in the time specified. MSTS has the choice of 
using ships of its own or of using commercial bottoms. Those who 
advocate this system say that, in effect, MSTS has embraced all 
ocean carriers and, in effect, there is only one carrier. Hence, 
routing is a matter of little, if any, concern to the shipper. I, for 
one, do not agree with this and am actively advocating that the 
three departments each pay for their cargo which is shipped in 
commercial bottoms at tariff rates and that they retain the right 
to specify that their cargo shall go by such shipments and on such 
ships as they select with MSTS merely negotiating the contract 
for the lift. If this is done, each service will have retained all that 
is essential in traffic management. 
Incident to the effect of unification on military transporta­
tion the question of priorities in traffic management has received 
considerable notice and to date there is no generally agreed upon 
policy with regard to priorities. Since priorities in many instances 
determine the sequence of shipment and in other cases result in 
premium transportation, it is obvious that there is need for an ac­
cepted policy with regard to them. One school of thought advo­
cates priorities predicated upon categories of material. Under this 
concept, for example, bullets might always precede beans, and 
beans always precede general stores. It may be perfectly true that 
under normal conditions, ammunition is more important than food, 
and food is more important than general stores, but this is not al­
ways so and we come to the belief of the second group who main­
tain that priorities are predicated upon need and not upon cate­
gories. Why should ammunition, they say, always come first when 
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you may have plenty of ammunition and not enough food? Or why 
should ammunition and food both come ahead of general stores 
when you may have plenty of ammunition and food and be in dire 
need of general stores? So they say that priorities are predicated 
Upon need and further that only the shipper, or the owner and user 
of the material, can determine need. This issue I hope to see 
settled in the very near future and settled by the establishment of 
the policy that need determine priority. 
No discussion of traffic management would be complete 
without consideration of the newest medium of transportation, 
namely, air lift, and on no subject in the field of transportation is 
their wider divergence of opinion, than there is on the matter of 
air lift. First, we have those who advocate it because they believe 
in anything pertaining to air, and those who oppose it because they 
have never been satisfied that the airplane is here to stay. There 
are those who distort the incomplete statistics of air lift during the 
war to prove any point of view they may happen to take, but air lift 
is here and it is here to stay. The question to be answered is, to 
what extent can it be relied upon and how can it best be used. The 
statistics of the last war are really of little help. First, few sta­
tistics w�re collected because people were more interested in getting· 
the job done than in recording what it took to get it done. Next, 
air lift just grew and it grew in an unplanned but surprisingly rapid 
fashion. And, third, there were many flagrant misuses of air lift, 
some through lack of understanding of its potentiality and of its 
cost and some through downright selfishness. There are many of 
us who operated in overseas supply fields during the war who re­
member. being denied air lift for vitally needed supplies only to 
find that the next incoming plane was loaded with a mahogany bar 
and slot machines for some air :field being established, or with 
wolf bait for some VIPs in the big cities of the ETO. Be that as 
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it may, the recent war convinced us that air lift was a factor in 
modern logistics. 
As of the present our approach to air lift is not too intelli­
gent and our thinking on that score can be illustrated by the con­
clusions reached by a certain clergyman who found himself con­
fronted by a couple desiring to be united in matrimony. Their ap­
pearance led him to inquire of the groom his age, and when the 
response came forth, "75," the clergyman asked "and why, sir, do 
you desire to be married?" The prospective groom said "Because 
I want an heir." The clergyman then turned to the prospective 
bride and asked her age. When told that she was 68, he asked her 
why she wanted to be married, and she said that she too wanted 
an heir. This led the clergyman to come to the conclusion that 
the couple were "heir-minded," but not "heir-conditioned." And 
so it is with our thinking. We are air minded but not air conditioned. 
We ship by air in part as an attempt to make up for mistakes in 
planning. We ship by air because we know that air travel is fast. 
We have yet to analyze our air lift and find out to what degree it 
is dependable, when air cargo is grounded how rapidly can we move 
the cargo to other means of travel, what is the true cost of air lift, 
what actual saving in time can be counted upon and what categories 
of material are best suited for air lift? When we have the answers 
to these questions and we apply them properly, air lift will be on a 
much firmer and more satisfactory footing. 
The true cost of our military air lift today is staggering. 
The reliability is very low. The average time saved is very little, 
but if we take the time to do some research, we will find our present 
cost of military air lift well worth while, and when I speak of re­
search I am speaking of research in the actual operation of a 
carrier service and in the actual traffic management which accom­
panies it. I am not one of those who believe that in the next war 
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we can dispense with supply depots and we can dispense with ships, 
all because everything will be brought by air immediately from the 
factory to the consumer's hands. I am one of those who believe 
that · substantial quantities of high priority cargo will and must 
be transported by air, and to do this satisfactorily we must have 
uniform documentation, we must have a route pattern to serve the 
customer's needs, operational performance must be measured in 
· terms of customer satisfaction not in terms of pilot satisfaction.
Parenthetically I define pilot satisfaction as on;..time departures plus
flight safety plus a high degree of aircraft utilization and similar
factors. And, :finally, we must have some rules qf thumb by which
we can readily determine when the expenditure of fuel and the use
of expensive equipment involved in air lift are warranted. In other
words we must know when we should ship by air and when we
should not ship by air. We need cargo aircraft designed for spec­
ific ranges and specific loading and discharge conditions. In short
what I have said about air lift is that it is an infant, a lusty in­
fant it is true, but nevertheless an inf ant.
Many of the schemes to achieve economy, which have been 
presented to the Department of Defense in the name of unification, 
would be perfectly sound if the Department of Defense were a busi­
ness, the objective of which was to show� profit. But when they de­
crease.the effectiveness of the Department of Defense as a military 
organization, they are without merit and definitely detrimental. The 
flaw in many of the schemes pertaining to logistics lies in the fact 
that all areas of logistics must be responsive and responsible to the 
tactical and strategical commanders, and these schemes do not recog­
nize this fact. Transportation, being one of the components of logis­
tics, must be also responsive and responsible to command. This is true 
in peace of traffic management and in war it is true of both carrier­
operations and traffic management. It is for this reason that I stated 
earlier that the three military departments are already of the opin­
ion that it would be unwise to centralize the traffic management of 
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the three military departments in any other agency of the Govern .. 
ment. This is also the reason why each of the three military de­
partments in establishing the Central Military Land Transportation 
Office reserved unto themselves the most important functions of 
traffic management. It is a self-evident fact that the efforts of the 
strategists and of the tactician are of no avail even though with 
the utmost brilliance they bring their forces to bear at the critical 
point and at the crucial time if those forces are without reserves 
and without supplies. The military commander must have as­
surance that his reserves of personnel and his requirements for 
supplies are delivered to him when and where he wants them, as 
well as in the quantities that he requires. It is transportation 
which gives time-place utility to material and per�onnel. !tis time-­
place utility that the commander requires. He must be complete­
ly sure, therefore, of his transportation and in order to be com;. 
pletely sure his transportation must be a component of his com­
mand subject to his will. 
During the recent war the Army established a Transporta­
tion Corps. It was the mission of this Corps both to operate carrier 
services on land and sea and to act as traffic manager for the ma­
terial and personnel of the Army when in transit. The people who 
constitute this Corps are exceptionally able in their field. The job 
they did during the war was outstanding, but having moved abroad, 
returned to the United States and then moved elsewhere abroad fab­
ulous quantities of material and tremendous numbers of persons, 
these people made the mistake of believing that they were operating 
a distribution system, particularly with respect to supplies, and 
since the war ended they have spent a great deal of time developing 
what they call the "factory-to-soldier program." They are excellent. 
traffic managers and I have pointed out that traffic management 
requires skilled technicians in a highly complex field, but they have 
overlooked the fact that the control of the distribution of material 
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requires just as highly trained technicians in a field quite as com­
plex and possibly more extensive. Careful analysis will show that 
traffic management is a tool of supply just as carrier operations are 
a tool of traffic management. 
In summation I wish to stress the following points: 
(1) Transportation is a large part of logistics, and logistics,
according to Field Marshal Montgomery, is 85% of modern war. 
(2) Transportation is a function of command.
(3) Transportation is a chain, and in times of maximum use its
links should be of equal strength. 
(4) The traffic manager must be a highly trained and skillful
technician for traffic management is very complex indeed. 
(5) Effectiveness being the all important criterion of a military
machine, consolidations predicated upon economy without effective­
ness are fatal. 
(6) The shipper should be able to exact from the carrier the
service he requires and the services of the carrier should be 
predicated upon the needs of the shipper and not upon the con­
venience of the carrier. 
(7) In modern traffic management air lift should be neither
over-emphasized nor ignored. It is an infant whose growth should 
be watched and stimulated. 
(8) Transportation is a tool of supply, not the director of
supply. 
(9) Finally, I offer the point that the logistician must have a
real appreciation of traffic management, but he should not attempt 
to be a traffic manager. The man who defends himself in court has 
a fool for a client, and the logistician who does his own traffic 
management is no logistician. 
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